In the meantime, the Syria Accountability Bill has many detractors. Some in the administration suggest that the bill would push Syria into Iraq's arms. Others have voiced their concern that holding Syria accountable for its blatant support of international terrorism might undermine the "reformist tendencies" of Syria's "youthful" president.
Still others warn that the United States has multiple, sometimes competing, foreign policy and national security interests and that they cannot all be pursued with equal vigor at once; attempting to do so, the theory goes, would undermine them all. Most significant, some senior administration officials have articulated the concern that the Syria Accountability Bill would curtail the administration's margin of maneuverability and thus deny them the flexibility necessary to conduct foreign policy.
In fact, the act incorporates a presidential "national security interest" waiver clause and, indicating its respect for the administration's need for flexibility, requires the government to select only two of the five most sensitive proposed sanctions.
This "margin of maneuverability" sends Asad and others the clear message that sponsoring certain terrorist groups may be tolerated in return for some level of cooperation against other groups.
Syria cannot be permitted to leverage cooperation related to the war on terror for American indifference concerning the regime's persistent terrorist activities. For example, despite Syrian intelligence sharing regarding the interrogation of al-Qaeda commander Mohamed Zammar, U. Syrian cooperation appears to be limited to those radical Islamic elements seen as a threat to the Alawite regime, even as it actively sponsors the other radical Islamist groups of both Sunni and Shi'i persuasions mentioned above.
Inducing Syria to abandon its support for terrorism through financial, diplomatic, or even military pressure will not be easy, even if such measures are coupled with face-saving gestures. Nevertheless, it is essential that the United States follow through on its declared policy of zero tolerance for state sponsorship of terrorism. History dictates that an even greater risk to U. Policy Analysis PolicyWatch Sep 19, On April 4, , the Syrian regime attacked the town of Khan Shaykhun with sarin killing up to people.
The Joint Investigative Mechanism of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations has attributed four chemical weapons attacks in , , and to the Syrian government.
Log in. Remember Me. Forgot password? Email this document Printable version. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Search Refworld. That the comparison is so banal is telling. For the past two decades, the debate among Syria observers has been less about how apt the analogy is, and more about whether Assad is the hapless Fredo Corleone or the ruthless but unexpected successor Michael Corleone. Ten years into the Syrian civil war, the Assad regime is desperate both for resources and support in key constituencies, and pursues schemes in all the places we would associate with an organized criminal enterprise.
Their reporting found that the Syrian state may not be formally involved, but it sanctions the production and trade of the illegal drug Captagon because the revenue from narcotics helps pay the salaries of soldiers the government cannot otherwise afford. The Syrian government relies on millions of dollars of bribes to generate resources to compensate a network of security officials it cannot afford to adequately pay on its own.
Considering the Syrian government as an archetypal criminal enterprise helps us better understand when and under what conditions it cooperates with terrorist organizations. Organized criminals seek to exploit gaps within the system, to their benefit. On the other hand, terrorist groups seek systemic change, and want to reduce the ability of the states in which they reside to govern; terrorist groups seek to present themselves as an alternative to the government. The two may cooperate, but that cooperation is limited and can also turn confrontational.
Secondly, from the US perspective, there are some practical applications of the state sponsor of terrorism designation of Syria that have utility for US national security purposes.
The designation allows the United States and its allies to pursue legal action against people, organizations, and even the Syrian government itself when it is responsible for enabling terrorist attacks.
Although criminal cases rarely result in convictions , nor civil cases in damages, that does not delegitimize the process of bringing these cases to light. Also, designation could help coerce change in the Syrian government.
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